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Labor  regulation  and  employment  relation  has  been  investigated  in  India  in  light  of  the  seminal  work  of
Besley and  Burgess  (2004),  considering  formal  sector  manufacturing  employment  as  the explained  vari-
able.  Empirical  ﬁndings  support,  although  not  very  strongly,  the  institutionalist  view,  i.e.,  pro-worker
amendment  in labour  laws  induces  employment.  Among  the  other  factors,  real  wage  rate  has  signiﬁcant
negative  effect  on  employment,  whereas  that  for  real per  capita  developmental  capital  expenditure,  per
capita electricity  generation  capacity  and  real  per  capita  net state  domestic  product  is signiﬁcant  positive.
However,  effect  of  per  capita  real  developmental  revenue  expenditure  is  inconclusive.  In other  words,
although  it improves  employability  of  workers  through  their human  capital  improvement,  which  is prob-
ably met  up at the  cost  of worsening  overall  infrastructural  development,  through  reducing  corresponding
capital  expenditure!  Supporting  evidence  has  also been  provided  favoring  this  conjecture.
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La  normativa  y la  regulación  laboral  se han  investigado  en  la India  a raíz  del  trabajo  original  de  Besley
y  Burguess  (2004),  tomando  como  variable  el empleo  formal  en  el sector  manufacturero.  Los  hallazgos
empíricos  respaldan,  aunque  no  rotundamente,  la  visión  institucionalista,  es decir,  que  la  enmienda  a
favor  del  trabajador  en  la  legislación  laboral  fomenta  el empleo.  Entre  otros  factores,  la  tasa  de  salario
real  tiene  un  impacto  signiﬁcativamente  negativo  en  el empleo,  mientras  que para  la inversión  de  capital
de desarrollo  per  cápita,  la capacidad  de  generación  de electricidad  per  cápita  y el producto  interno  esalabras clave:
egulación laboral
ector formal
signiﬁcativamente  positiva.  No  obstante,  el  efecto  del costo  de  los ingresos  del  desarrollo  real  per  cápita
no es concluyente.  En  otras  palabras,  si bien  esto  favorezca  la  inserción  laboral  de  los trabajadores  con  unampleo manufacturero
iberalización
mejora  del  capital  humano,  pro
al  reducir  la  inversión  en  capit
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. Introduction
India’s manufacturing sector witnessed an accelerated growth
ince 1980, largely due to the lowering of government controls,
ncrease in public infrastructure and a higher inﬂow of private
nvestment in the sector (Anderson Business Consulting, 2003).
y 2011-12, the country had nearly 1.76 lakh operational facto-
ies employing 13.4 million people, producing output worth nearly
upees 58 thousand billion in current prices (Government of India,
012). At the same time, however, the manufacturing value added
s a percentage of GDP was consistently lower than the correspond-
ng global average (see Table 1). This moderate growth has been a
haracteristic feature of her manufacturing sector ever since inde-
endence, with its contribution hovering around 15% of the GDP
hroughout. If the sector realizes its full potential, this contribu-
ion could go up as high as 25 to 30% in another decade (Dhawan,
waroop, & Zainulbhai, 2012).
While this estimate is impressive for the country as a whole,
here is considerable disparity in this regard across her states.
nly ﬁve states namely Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra, (the undivided)
ndhra Pradesh, Gujarat, and Uttar Pradesh accounted for 59.4%
f factories, 55.3% of employment and 50.9% of net value added in
010. Presence of some of the India’s best manufacturing hubs1 in
hese states corroborates the above fact (Business Today, 2008).
owever, there exists considerable variation even among these
tates in various aspects. For instance, Maharashtra’s net state
omestic product (NSDP) was more than double the NSDP of
any of) the other four States in 2011; Uttar Pradesh is twice as
opulous as the others, and the literacy rate of these ﬁve states
anges between 67 to 82% (according to the latest Census of India,
011). Needless to say, Indian states also differ considerably in the
atures of the various amendments of Industrial Disputes Act as is
one by the various State Governments from time to time. Besley
nd Burgess (2004) investigate whether the industrial relations
limate in Indian states has affected the pattern of manufactur-
ng growth during the period 1958-1992. They show that states
hich amended the Industrial Disputes Act in a pro-worker direc-
ion experienced lowered output, employment, investment, and
roductivity in registered manufacturing. In contrast, output in
nregistered manufacturing increased. Regulating in a pro-worker
irection was also associated with increases in urban poverty,
hich suggests that attempts to redress the balance of power
etween capital and labor can end up hurting the poor.
The objective of the present study is to extend the study of Besley
nd Burgess (2004) to evaluate the impact of labor regulation and
arious other factors on employment in the registered manufactur-
ng sector in fourteen large Indian States. While the existing studies
ave focused on the ﬁrst four decades since independence, we  con-
ne ourselves for the post-1980 era on account of the fact that
lthough the process of liberalization of the Indian economy, in gen-
ral and her industrial sector, in particular gathered momentum in
991, it actually started in the early 1980s, under the Prime Minis-
erial regimes of Late Indira Gandhi and Late Rajiv Gandhi (DeLong,
003). In other words, we consider the post-liberalization period in
 broader sense. We  hope to check the impact of labor regulation
n employment in the semi-liberalized Indian economy since she
s still in the process of liberalization and complete liberalization of
er various sectors is yet to be reached.
The central piece of legislation under consideration here is the
ndustrial Disputes Act, 1947 pertaining to matters in the joint
1 To be speciﬁc, some of these are Greater Noida (in Uttar Pradesh), Pune, Nasik
nd Aurangabad (in Maharashtra) and Sriperumbudur (in Tamil Nadu).ce and Administrative Science 21 (2016) 63–72
jurisdiction of the States and the Central Government2. By deﬁn-
ing legitimate circumstances under which an employee may  be
retrenched, the Act hinders smooth functioning of the labor mar-
ket. This intervention is of signiﬁcance, as it worsens the ability of
manufacturing units to effectively respond to market changes by
reducing workers on their rolls. India’s GDP growth touches as low
as 3.24% in 2012-13 (according to the provisional ﬁgure for 2012-13
released by Central Statistical Organization (CSO)). A key recom-
mendation, among many other signiﬁcant policy changes being
suggested to boost the growth, is to loosen the grip on the labor
market by amending the Industrial Disputes Act. Pro-employer
amendments may  be helpful ensuring the manufacturing units to
ﬁnd it easier to ﬁre employees, if market conditions desire so. This
smoothening of the hiring and ﬁring process is hoped to give a ﬁllip
to the stagnating growth of registered manufacturing sector. It is
imperative that the effect of labor regulation on employment needs
careful study in this context.
Labor markets are usually regulated at various levels and to the
extent of various degrees as well in almost every country across
the globe. Such intervention in its smooth functioning affects the
instantaneous adjustment of the supply and demand for labor in
an economy. Modern welfare states use to offer job protection
to the workers, especially to those at the lower end of the pyra-
mid. Effect of these constraints on growth, employment, and other
macroeconomic variables has been a topic of intense theoretical
and empirical debate.
Theoretical arguments take mainly two  divergent stands,
namely the distortionist and the institutionalist views (Jha & Golder,
2008). Proponents of the earlier view opine that any labor reg-
ulation would affect the smooth functioning and instantaneous
adjustment mechanism of the labor market, thereby lowering
rates of job creation and raise unemployment. Regulations are also
likely to hinder the entire economy to perform smoothly, result-
ing in lower levels of growth and productivity and higher level
of poverty. Ironically, therefore, labor market rigidities through
various regulatory measures designed to protect the poor even-
tually end up hurting them (Besley & Burgess, 2004). Rather, free
market ensures market to respond faster to any contemporaneous
change in demand for and supply of labor by quickly reallocating
them elsewhere. The process, therefore, is more likely to beneﬁt
labor by paying at least its marginal productivity without mak-
ing them jobless. Actually, the neo-classical push to deregulate
labor market emerged strongly during the 1980s when much of the
developed world was reeling under the pressure of high unemploy-
ment. Evidence from the Organization of Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) countries suggested that tighter reg-
ulations were a cause of concerns at that point of time. It was
argued that to achieve full employment, workers must accept
lower wages, stingier unemployment beneﬁts and less secure jobs
(Howell, 2005). However, the evidence for this orthodoxy is at
best mixed, says Richard Freeman in his Foreword to the book.
However, although such proposition is widely accepted, it is not
unanimously appreciated (Nickell, Nunziata, & Ochel, 2005). The
latter view opines that, in fact, there is a growing empirical liter-
ature that suggests otherwise (Oswald, 1997). They advocate that
the labor market regulations and trade unions’ bargaining power
play an important role in protecting not only the vulnerable sec-
tions of the society, but beneﬁt the economy as a whole as well.
For instance, labor regulations might end up boosting productivity
2 The concurrent list (i.e., the List III) of Schedule IX of the Constitution of India
contains 47 items of joint jurisdiction of the Central and State Governments. Leg-
islation on Trade Union, Industrial and Labor Disputes can be carried out by both
Central and State Governments.
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Table  1
Manufacturing output as a percentage of GDP.
Year India China EU OECD Pakistan Sub-Saharan Africa USA  World
1998 15.0 31.8 19.3 18.7 15.8 13.6 16.9 19.2
1999  14.6 31.6 18.7 18.4 15.5 13.0 16.7 19.0
2000  15.3 32.1 18.6 18.1 14.7 13.0 15.9 18.7
2001 14.6 31.6 18.1 17.2 15.5 13.2 14.6 17.9
2002 14.9 31.4 17.5 16.8 15.5 13.1 14.4 17.6
2003 14.9 32.8 17.0 16.4 16.0 13.1 14.0 17.4
2004 15.3 32.4 16.8 16.5 17.2 12.9 14.3 17.5
2005 15.4 32.5 16.5 16.3 18.6 12.4 14.2 17.3
2006 16.1 32.9 16.4 16.1 13.8 11.9 13.9 17.1
2007 16.0 32.9 16.4 16.1 14.0 11.7 13.8 17.1
2008 15.4 32.7 15.7 15.4 15.2 11.5 12.9 16.5
2009 15.1 32.3 14.3 14.4 13.4 10.9 12.4 15.6
2010 14.8 32.5 15.1 15.1 13.6 10.9 12.6 16.2
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through its various rounds of surveys. The registered manufactur-
ing sector includes two types of factories–those employing 10 or
more workers and using power and those employing 20 or more2011  14.7 31.8 15.1 15.1
ource: The World Bank.
y making job-training mandatory, which has an obvious favorable
earing on overall growth and prosperity of a country.
Several cross-country studies lend credence to both pro- and
nti-regulation arguments. In other words, empirical evidence
cross the world is equivocal in nature. Let us, ﬁrst of all, review
ome important studies in favor of the anti-regulation arguments. A
recursor to these studies is the inﬂuential OECD Jobs Study (OECD,
994). In this connection we would also like to mention some of
ts signiﬁcant policy recommendations, which include complete
r partial elimination of minimum wages, shifting from (direct)
abor income tax to (indirect) consumption tax, easing restric-
ions on employee layoffs, reforms to unemployment beneﬁts, etc.
hese seem to be supported by empirical evidence from both the
eveloping as well as the developed countries across the globe.
otero, Djankov, La Porta, López-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2004)
xamine the regulation of labor markets through employment, col-
ective relations, and social security laws in 85 countries. The study
xtensively collates data on the legal frameworks prevail in these
ountries and creates indices to measure the strength of regulation.
heir ﬁndings suggest that political power of the left is associated
ith more stringent labor regulations and more generous social
ecurity systems, and that socialist, French and Scandinavian legal
rigin countries have sharply higher levels of labor regulation than
hat in other common law countries. They conclude that increasing
egulation of labor can lead to a larger unofﬁcial economy, lower
abor force participation and higher unemployment, especially
mong the youths. Using data panel on 76 countries during 1970
hrough 2000, Calderón and Chong (2005) also show that stricter
abor laws adversely affect the growth of both industrial and devel-
ping countries. Institutionally ﬁxed minimum wages and trade
nion activities are two important factors to adversely affecting
rowth and its slowing down is due to sluggish wage adjustments
nd reallocation of labor arisen therefrom. Heckman and Pagés
2004) studied the impact of labor regulation on employment and
rowth in the Latin American countries. The study concludes that
abor market interventions by the State affect the youth, marginal
orkers and unskilled workers the most. While social security ben-
ﬁts (unemployment beneﬁts in this case) reduce employment, job
ecurity regulations affect the distribution of employment. In fact,
he regulations provide a sense of security for the insiders (i.e., who
re already in job) at the cost of loss incurred by the outsiders (i.e.,
ho are looking for it) due to rigidities in the labor market.
On the other hand, there is a signiﬁcant and growing body of
tudies that present a different picture altogether. The study of
aker, Glyn, Howell and Schmitt (2005) on 20 OECD countries
efutes the orthodox conclusions of the above studies. Using a
odiﬁed and improved dataset with interactions between institu-
ions, they show that there is no statistically signiﬁcant relationship14.3 10.3 12.9 16.1
between labor market regulations (in the form of taxation, unem-
ployment beneﬁts, legal institutions, etc.) and unemployment.
Dutta Roy (2004) investigates the extent of impact of job secu-
rity legislation through an analysis of dynamic interrelated factor
demand function, including that for the factor labor, for the Indian
industries. His ﬁndings suggest that although there is evidence for
some impact of job security legislation on employment adjustment,
however, contrary to the popular belief, extent of such impact is
minimal. Although the study of Nataraj, Pérez-Arce, Kumar and
Srinivasan (2013) using a meta-analysis on low income countries
shows a negative effect of regulations on formal sector employ-
ment, it has a compensating positive effect on that in the informal
sector, thereby concluding for an ambiguous effect on overall
employment. Leximetric3 study by Deakin and Sarkar (2011) to see
the impact of Indian Labor Laws on unemployment for the period of
1970 through 2006 does not ﬁnd any evidence to support the view
that pro-worker labor regulation leads to unemployment or indus-
trial stagnation. Rather, contrary to the conventional wisdom, they
observe that the pro-worker labor laws are associated with low
unemployment with the direction of causality being the other way,
i.e., it runs from unemployment and output to labor regulations.
The paper unfolds as follows. Section 2 discusses few stylized
facts on manufacturing sector in India. Analytical methodology,
data set and the variables chosen for our analyses are presented
in Section 3. Section 4 presents the results obtained and Section
5 concludes. Appendix highlights on limitation(s) of the study and
states on future scope of research in this connection. It throws some
light as well in details on formation of variables from the available
information.
2. Manufacturing sector in India
Manufacturing sector in India covers all manufacturing,
processing and repair and maintenance services units. India’s man-
ufacturing sector may  be classiﬁed under two broader groups,
namely registered (or organized) and unregistered (or unorga-
nized). Information on the earlier is collected and published by
CSO through its Annual Survey of Industries (ASI), while that
on the latter is by National Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO)3 Leximetrics is a ﬁeld which attempts to rank the strengths or weaknesses of
laws, by assigning a numerical value to each type of law in a particular context.
Such assigned numerical ﬁgures are then used to compare the efﬁcacy of differ-
ent  legal systems and to see how these numbers are correlated with economic
growth or employment related goals.
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capacity (in kilo-Watt).
NSDP: (logarithmic value of) real per capita net state domestic
product in rupees lakh (at 1981 prices).
7 To provide a brief overview here in this context, we  conﬁne ourselves to four-
teen large Indian States, namely Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat, Haryana, Karnataka,
Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar
Pradesh and West Bengal. Since the three young States, viz., Chhattisgarh, Uttaran-
chal and Jharkhand were carved out of Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh and Bihar
respectively, for ease of analysis, in general and to make the data points pertaining
to them comparable over time, in particular, these have been merged with their
parent States. In fact, only ten of them made amendments in either direction dur-
ing the period of our concern. Each amendment from each State has been coded
appropriately and details of it are shown in the Appendix.
8 Alternatively, we  also use (logarithmic value of) employment rate in registered6 A.K. Bhandari, A. Sudarsan / Journal of Economics
orkers without using power on any day of the preceding
2 months. All the remaining manufacturing units come under the
mbrella of unregistered manufacturing.
The contribution of (both registered and unregistered) man-
facturing sector in India to her GDP is shown in Table 2. One
mportant feature here is that although the contribution of overall
anufacturing to GDP witnesses a negligible increase and remains
lmost stagnant (around 15%) during these three decades4, that
rom registered manufacturing shows an increasing trend through-
ut. We  would like to mention in this connection that the number
f factories in Indian manufacturing sector and workers employed
herein have both increased by 64% and 49% respectively during the
ost-1981 thirty years period, however, registered manufacturing
mployment did not increase that much5. Average real wage (at
981 prices) per worker has also gone up by more than 28%, from
s.6235 to Rs.8002 per annum. In fact, most of the Indian States
xperience increases in the number of factories, workers and real
age during this period, with an exception for West Bengal where
oth the number of industrial workers as well as their average real
age has gone down. However, extent of such changes varies sig-
iﬁcantly from one State to another. To be speciﬁc, while Rajasthan,
amil Nadu, Punjab, Haryana, and Himachal Pradesh experience
ore than doubled the number of industrial workers during this
eriod, West Bengal and Bihar witnessed decrease in the corre-
ponding number of employees6. Himachal Pradesh also witnesses
he highest increase in real wage (of 89%) during this period, while
un-divided) Andhra Pradesh comes next (with 74%).
. Analytical methodology, variables and data
As we have already mentioned, we largely follow (a modiﬁed
ersion of) the Besley and Burgess (2004) methodology to analyse
ur data base of 1981-2011 to see the effect of labor regulation
n employment in the registered manufacturing sector in India.
eing a federal democratic system having two tiers of governments,
iz., a Union Government at the Centre and several State Govern-
ents, Laws in India can be formed as well as amended at both
he levels. There is a clear-cut guideline in the Constitution of India
eparately listing the subject matters on which each house can leg-
slate upon. Industrial Disputes comes under the joint jurisdiction of
oth the Central and State Governments. To be speciﬁc, it is placed
nder the concurrent list of the Constitution. This allows the State
overnments to bring in appropriate modiﬁcations even to (some
f) the Central Laws to meet local challenges, considering the spe-
iﬁc nature of local conditions in the backdrop. Industrial Dispute
ct, 1947 is one such of them. Nevertheless, in case of any conﬂict
etween the Central and State legislations, the Central Law shall
revail.
This study hypothesizes that the amendments to the Industrial
isputes Act, 1947 is an important determinant of employment in
he registered manufacturing sector. Each amendment at the State
evel is analyzed and eventually coded under three labels—pro-
mployee,  pro-employer, or neutral.  For the ease in quantitative
nalysis, they were noted as +1 (for pro-employee),–1 (for pro-
mployer), and 0 (for neutral). However, if there is more than one
mendment in a year, such year(s) is noted as +1,–1, or 0 based
n the overall direction of the changes. For an illustration, con-
ider the following amendment made by the Gujarat Legislative as
4 However, this share increases further to 16.1% in 2009-10 (Trivedi et al., 2011).
5 It is argued in a recent Press Release that . . .employment generation in registered
anufacturing sector soared 28.5% during 11th plan (ASSOCHAM, March 14, 2014).
6 It is to be noted in this connection that worker and employee refer to two different
oncepts in ASI database, with their distinct respective meanings. However, we use
oth of them interchangeably, to refer workers only.ce and Administrative Science 21 (2016) 63–72
an exception from the deﬁnition of retrenchment. “Termination of
service of a workman in an industrial establishment situated in the Spe-
cial Economic Zone (SEZ) declared as such by the Government of India”
(Malik, 2013). This amendment clearly allows industries in the SEZs
in Gujarat to freely retrench workers. It is, therefore, coded as–1 and
placed under the pro-employer category. A detailed exposition of all
such amendments made by different Indian states during our study
period, along with their assigned codes, is shown in the Appendix7.
In doing so, we largely depend on Malik (2013) for the details of
such amendments enacted in different Indian States from time to
time.
We use (logarithmic value of) employment in registered man-
ufacturing sector as the dependent variable in our analysis. To
explain it, we  use a set of explanatory variables, which include (log-
arithmic value of) total number of workers in the respective states,
as a control variable8. Although Besley and Burgess (2004) use total
population of a State as a control variable, we  use total work force
for it to adjust for the differences in availability of employable popu-
lation across the States considered. The other explanatory variables
are assigned code for the amendment in the Industrial Dispute Act,
1947 made by the concerned States (with four years lag9), (log-
arithmic value of) real earning per worker, (logarithmic value of)
per capita real developmental revenue expenditure (with no lag, a
period lag and two periods lag, as indicated in footnote #9), (loga-
rithmic value of) per capita real developmental capital expenditure
(with no lag, a period lag and two periods lag), (logarithmic value
of) per capita electricity generation capacity and (logarithmic
value of) real per capita net state domestic product. The abbrevia-
tion of these variables and their deﬁnition are as follows:
Emp: (logarithmic value of) employment/rate10 of employment
in registered manufacturing sector.
Amend: assigned code to the respective amendments.
Earn: (logarithmic value of) real earning per worker in rupees
(at 1981 prices).
DRExp: (logarithmic value of) real per capita developmental
revenue expenditure in rupees (at 1981 prices).
DCExp: (logarithmic value of) real per capita developmental
capital expenditure in rupees (at 1981 prices).
Elec: (logarithmic value of) per capita electricity generationmanufacturing sector as dependent variable. In such case, we do not use this control
variable for obvious reason.
9 We use lag value of those variables which conceptually thought of taking some
time to cast its effect on the dependent variable we  have considered. We  have tried
with different lags, for instance with one year lag, two year lag and so on. We observe
amendment to be signiﬁcant (in some cases) with a lag of four years only. Hence, we
take this variable with four years lag and write our population regression equation
accordingly. Again, for each of per capita developmental capital expenditure and per
capita developmental revenue expenditure we have taken three alternative possi-
bilities, i.e., with no lag, one year lag and two years lag. However, we heuristically
take such lag to be just one year for the per capita electricity generation capacity
variable.
10 Kindly refer to footnote #8 for more clariﬁcation in this regard.
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Table  2
India’s manufacturing sector GDP.
Period Manufacturing GDP Registered manufacturing GDP Unregistered manufacturing GDP
1980-85 101412 (14.3) 55571 (7.8) 45841 (6.5)
1985-90 133812 (14.7) 79756 (8.7) 54056 (6.0)
1990-95 171233 (14.6) 109247 (9.3) 61987 (5.3)
1995-2000 248504 (15.7) 162847 (10.3) 85657 (5.4)
2000-05 316307 (15.1) 212370 (10.1) 103938 (5.0)
2001-06 338105 (15.0) 228619 (10.2) 109486 (4.9)
2002-07 367898 (15.1) 249583 (10.3) 118315 (4.9)
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bsolute ﬁgure is average (in rupees crore at 1999-2000 prices) during the period.
ource: Trivedi et al., 2011.
Worker11: (logarithmic value of) total workforce in the State
Therefore, we have conceptualized the population regression
quation to be as follows:
Empst = ˛s + t + ˇ1Amendst−4 + ˇ2Earnst + ˇ3DRExpst−j
+ˇ4DCExpst−iˇ5Elecst−1 + ˇ6NSDPst + ˇ7Workerst + εst
here subscripts s and t stand for concerned State and time respec-
ively. Again, as already indicated in footnote #9, each of i and j can
ake values 0, 1 or 2 in the subscript of the explanatory variable
CExp and DRExp respectively. An exposition of some descriptive
tatistics of the variables we have considered is shown in Table 3.
With regard to the expected sign of the (coefﬁcients of) explana-
ory variables, Worker is supposed to have a positive effect on
anufacturing employment since it acts as an indicator of avail-
bility of employable workforce in the respective state, with Amend
ay  have either of the possible signs, depending upon which of the
wo views, viz., institutionalist and distortionist is actually in force
n India, as discussed earlier. Since pro-employee amendment is
ssigned a positive value, a negative sign of this variable corrobo-
ates the distortionist view and vice versa. In other words, potential
ntrepreneurs will be attracted to invest more once labor law(s)
s amended to make it more employer-friendly, thereby increas-
ng industrial employment and vice versa. In fact, code assigned
or the change in labor regulation (i.e., amendment to the Industrial
isputes Act, 1947 enacted by each of the 14 States), ten States had
mendments in either of the directions at least for one year, while
he remaining four States12 remained neutral. Real earning per
orker is assumed to be a critical factor which is expected to have a
egative effect on employment rate. To be speciﬁc, industries may
hift to more capital intensive production techniques when formal
ector wage increases to substitute dearer input labor by the rela-
ively cheaper input capital.  Moreover, industries may  also look for
easing out some of their ancillary activities through sub-contracting
hich are otherwise produced in-house. In that case, informal sec-or employment is supposed to increase at the cost of that in the
ormal sector. To mention here, near stagnation in growth of real
ages over the last three decades is a worrying factor for Indian
ndustries. More recently, real wages have started to contract as
11 We have used total work force in a state as a control variable to explain employ-
ent of that state. However, as is already noted in the footnote #8, one ought not to
se such control variable while s/he explains employment rate, instead of employ-
ent itself. We  have estimated both the equations, one using (logarithmic value of)
mployment and the other with that of employment rate as the dependent variable.
n  view of the fact that the basic results of these two  alternatives are largely of same
ind, we report either of the two  for different cases for which it shows even slightly
etter! However, the other set of results can be made readily available on demand,
f  any.
12 To be speciﬁc, Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Maharash-
ra,  Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu and West Bengal make some amendments
n  the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 in either of the directions during our study period,
hile Bihar, Kerala, Uttar Pradesh and Haryana remain neutral in this regard.well. To be speciﬁc, West Bengal witnessed a decline in real wages
from 1981 levels. In fact, remuneration of support/managerial staff
has been growing consistently since the 1990s, leaving the real
wage of workers nearly constant or declining. This has resulted in
a shift in preference with young graduates opting for managerial
roles within manufacturing units (Trivedi et al., 2011). In view of
the facts that the developmental revenue expenditure is supposed
to improve overall developmental status of any state, in general
and developmental capital expenditure helps improving overall
infrastructural facilities available there, in particular, each of these
variables is expected to have a positive effect in increasing formal
sector manufacturing employment as well. Although such posi-
tive effect of developmental capital expenditure on formal sector
employment is unambiguous, if developmental revenue expen-
diture is ﬁnanced at the cost of reducing developmental capital
expenditure, the earlier may  even have a negative effect on employ-
ment, of course, through the latter! Per capita installed capacity of
electricity generation is considered as a proxy for the availability
of infrastructure favorable for industrialization in the concerned
State. In other words, we  hypothesize that increase in availability of
electricity (which is considered to be one of the essential inputs for
any modern industrial activity) would attract more entrepreneurs
to establish new factories thereby resulting in an increase in indus-
trial employment13. In view of the fact that an increasing real per
capita net state domestic product scenario is indicative of the pros-
perity of the state concerned, it is also supposed to have a positive
effect on overall employment ﬁgures of the state, in general and that
for the manufacturing sector as well. Table 4 throws some light on
their expected sign, citing the similar study from the literature. It
also shows our ﬁndings in this regard.
4. Econometric analyses and results
We have applied pooled ordinary least squares (OLS), ﬁxed effect
(FE) as well as random effect (RE) regression models of panel data.
Results of these analyses are demonstrated in Tables 5, 6 and 7. As is
observed from the theoretical structure of our population regres-
sion equation shown above, since we have allowed both state as
well as time speciﬁc ﬁxed effects, if any, there may  be the case that
the data is cross section wise hetero-scedastic as well as time series
wise auto-correlated. To accommodate such possible effect(s) into
our estimation results, we  also use Parks (1967) method, results of
which are shown in Table 8.
Since the assigned code (to the corresponding amendment(s)
to the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 enacted by respective State)
is positive when it is pro-employee, positive and signiﬁcant
(although only at 10% level) value of its estimated coefﬁcient clearly
13 In fact, each of the selected State has been able to (at least) double its capacity
over the last three decades, with Uttar Pradesh being an exception in this regard. And,
Himachal Pradesh and Rajasthan recorded the highest increase to make it (almost)
7  and 5.5 times respectively.
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Table  3
Descriptive statistics of the variables considered.
Variable Average Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
Assigned code to the amendment(s) 0.022 0.204 1 –1
Earnings per worker (in Rs.)
(at 1981 prices)
8330 2270 3250 18200
Developmental revenue expenditure per capita (in Rs.) 110 37 45 241
Developmental capital expenditure per capita (in Rs.) 5.6 12.6 0.027 119
Per  capita electricity generation capacity (in kilo-watt) 0.076 0.042 0.013 0.192
Per  capita net state domestic product (in Rs. million) (at 1981 prices) 167300 133500 31452 996300
Number of workers 453022 277856 89349 1542000
Employment rate (in %) 2.1 1.1 0.4 4.8
Source: Authors’ own compilation.
Table 4
Suggested sign in the literature vis-à-vis our ﬁndings on the explanatory variables.
Explained variable: employment in the registered manufacturing sector
Explanatory variable Suggested sign Supporting literature Our  ﬁndings
Assigned code to the amendment(s) Negative Besley and Burgess (2004) Positive
Earnings per worker Negative Dutta Roy (2004) Negative
Developmental revenue expenditure Positive Besley and Burgess (2004) Ambiguous
Developmental capital expenditure Positive Besley and Burgess (2004) Positive
Per  capita electricity generation capacity Positive Besley and Burgess (2004) Positive
Net  state domestic product Positive Besley and Burgess (2004) Positive
Number of workers Positive Besley and Burgess (2004) Positive
Source: Authors’ survey of the literature.
Table 5
Pooled OLS regression result.
Dependent variable
Explanatory variable ln employment ln employment rate
Amend 0.066 0.082* 0.075* 0.066 0.078* 0.075*
(with  4 years lag) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.045) (0.045) (0.044)
Earn  0.036 0.075 0.002 0.019 0.032 –0.018
(0.113) (0.112) (0.113) (0.116) (0.116) (0.116)
DRExp 0.216* 0.149
(0.114) (0.117)
DRExp
(with 1 year lag)
–0.306***
(0.117)
–0.082
(0.112)
DRExp –0.198* –0.228**
(with  2 years lag) (0.106) (0.109)
DCExp 0.003 0.005
(0.009) (0.009)
DCExp –0.013 –0.013
(with 1 year lag) (0.008) (0.009)
DCExp –0.015* –0.015*
(with  2 year lag) (0.008) (0.008)
Elec  0.168** 0.171** 0.165** 0.206*** 0.215*** 0.197***
(with  1 year lag) (0.071) (0.070) (0.071) (0.073) (0.072) (0.072)
Worker –0.121
(0.263)
–0.353
(0.281)
–0.025
(0.259)
NSDP 0.262** 0.263** 0.289*** 0.417*** 0.432*** 0.414***
(0.106) (0.102) (0.101) (0.103) (0.100) (0.100)
Constant 18.29*** 18.16*** 13.51*** 1.313 –0.332 –1.912
(4.112) (3.978) (4.091) (1.059) (1.100) (1.263)
No.  of observations 318 318 319@ 318 318 319
R-squared 0.959 0.959 0.959 0.942 0.942 0.943
State-speciﬁc ﬁxed
effect
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-speciﬁc ﬁxed
effect
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Approximated up to three decimal points.
Figure in parenthesis is the respective standard error.
***, ** and * indicate that the p value to be respectively less than 1%, 5% and 10%.
@:  There may  be a slight mismatch in number of observations across alternatively estimated equations in each of the subsequent Tables as well, since DRExp value is missing
for  Uttar Pradesh in 1996.
Source: Authors’ own estimation.
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Table  6
Fixed effect panel data regression result.
Dependent variable
Explanatory variable ln employment rate
Amend 0.045 0.110 0.053 0.045 0.110 0.053
(with  4 years lag) (0.081) (0.075) (0.081) (0.081) (0.075) (0.081)
Earn  –0.729*** –1.023*** –0.874*** –0.729*** –1.023*** –0.874***
(0.087) (0.075) (0.080) (0.087) (0.075) (0.080)
DRExp 0.444*** 0.444*
(0.093) (0.093)
DRExp
(with 1 year lag)
–0.559***
(0.077)
–0.559***
(0.077)
DRExp 0.248*** 0.248***
(with  2 years lag) (0.060) (0.060)
DCExp –0.013 –0.013
(0.014) (0.014)
DCExp –0.039*** –0.039***
(with 1 year lag) (0.013) (0.013)
DCExp 0.009 0.009
(with  2 year lag) (0.014) (0.014)
Elec  0.015 0.176*** –0.014 0.015 0.176*** –0.014
(with  1 year lag) (0.069) (0.065) (0.068) (0.069) (0.065) (0.068)
NSDP  1.068*** 0.855*** 1.273*** 1.068*** 0.855 1.273
(0.102) (0.098) (0.088) (0.102) (0.098) (0.088)
Constant 1.088 –6.009*** 0.101 1.088 –6.009*** 0.101
(0.719) (0.729) (0.594) (0.719) (0.729) (0.594)
No.  of Observations 318 318 319 318 318 319
R-squared 0.793 0.825 0.791 0.793 0.825 0.791
State-speciﬁc ﬁxed
effect
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-speciﬁc ﬁxed
effect
No No No Yes Yes Yes
Approximated up to three decimal points.
Figure in parenthesis is the respective standard error.
*** indicates that the p value to be less than 1%.
Source: Authors’ own estimation.
Table 7
Random effect panel data regression result.
Dependent variable
Explanatory variable ln employment rate
Amend 0.058 0.074 0.072 0.066 0.078* 0.075*
(with  4 years lag) (0.048) (0.047) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.044)
Earn  –0.124 –0.027 –0.079 0.019 0.032 –0.018
(0.105) (0.105) (0.099) (0.116) (0.116) (0.116)
DRExp –0.279** 0.149
(0.109) (0.117)
DRExp
(with 1 year lag)
–0.559***
(0.085)
–0.082
(0.112)
DRExp –0.559*** –0.228**
(with  2 years lag) (0.085) (0.109)
DCExp 0.015* 0.005
(0.009) (0.009)
DCExp –0.002 –0.013
(with 1 year lag) (0.009) (0.009)
DCExp –0.006 –0.015*
(with  2 year lag) (0.008) (0.008)
Elec  0.194** 0.201*** 0.167** 0.206*** 0.215*** 0.197***
(with  1 year lag) (0.076) (0.074) (0.072) (0.073) (0.072) (0.072)
NSDP  0.086 0.141* 0.179** 0.417*** 0.432*** 0.414***
(0.089) (0.080) (0.077) (0.103) (0.100) (0.099)
Constant –3.479*** –4.554*** –5.726*** 1.313 –0.332 –1.912
(0.805) (0.757) (0.799) (1.059) (1.100) (1.263)
No.  of observations 318 318 319 318 318 319
R-squared
(overall)
0.896 0.903 0.907 0.942 0.942 0.943
State-speciﬁc ﬁxed
effect
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-speciﬁc ﬁxed
effect
No No No Yes Yes Yes
Approximated up to three decimal points.
Figure in parenthesis is the respective standard error.
***, ** and * indicate that the p value to be respectively less than 1%, 5% and 10%.
Source: Authors’ own estimation.
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Table  8
Regression results following Parks’ (1967) Method.
Dependent variable ln employment
Explanatory variables With
Constant
Without
Constant
With
Constant
Without
Constant
With
Constant
Without
Constant
Amend
(with 4 years lag)
0.025 0.070 –0.014 0.059 0.097 0.116
(0.091) (0.100) (0.097) (0.106) (0.094) (0.103)
Earn –0.262*** –0.680*** –0.262*** –0.677*** –0.254*** –0.688***
(0.080) (0.069) (0.081) (0.069) (0.079) (0.069)
DRExp 0.193* 0.337***
(0.107) (0.101)
DRExp
(with 1 year lag)
0.177*
(0.107)
–0.325***
(0.102)
DRExp
(with 2 years lag)
0.221**
(0.104)
–0.305***
(0.102)
DCExp 0.021 0.042***
(0.015) (0.015)
DCExp
(with 1 year lag)
0.021
(0.015)
0.044***
(0.015)
DCExp
(with 2 years lag)
0.037** 0.033***
(0.015) (0.002)
Elec
(with  1 year lag)
0.616*** 0.359*** 0.603*** 0.348*** 0.633*** 0.360***
(0.066) (0.065) (0.067) (0.065) (0.066) (0.065)
NSDP  0.131 0.510*** 0.152 0.524*** 0.106 0.494***
(0.096) (0.086) (0.095) (0.086) (0.093) (0.087)
Workers 0.742*** 0.861*** 0.739*** 0.865*** 0.730*** 0.865***
(0.038) (0.039) (0.038) (0.039) (0.038) (0.038)
Constant 7.471***
(0.927)
7.378***
(0.938)
7.753***
(0.913)
Observations 338 338 325 325 312 312
R-squared 0.991 0.999 0.991 0.999 0.992 0.999
No.  of States 13# 13 13 13 13 13
Approximated up to three decimal points.
Figure in parenthesis is the respective standard error.
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are otherwise produced in-house. Work force, a control variable in
our analysis, has a signiﬁcant direct effect on employment for all the**, ** and * indicate that the p value to be respectively less than 1%, 5% and 10%;
:  We  do not consider Uttar Pradesh for some missing value, to make our data a ba
ource: Authors’ own estimation.
orroborates institutionalist view that the level of (formal sector)
anufacturing employment increases with an employee-friendly
mendment to the Act. However, we have obtained such result only
or few cases in both the pooled OLS as well as the RE models. Again,
ince it becomes signiﬁcant only when we consider it with four
ears lag, amendment in labor laws/regulations takes on an average
our years to cast its inducing effect on formal sector manufacturing
ndustrial employment generation!
In an increasingly liberalized economy, labor laws may  act as an
mportant tool to generate employment. Given this backdrop, our
esult in this regard has signiﬁcant implication for two reasons: (a)
ccording to Deakin and Sarkar (2011), pro-worker labor laws are
ssociated with low unemployment, with the direction of causal-
ty running from unemployment and output to labor regulation;
nd (b) it opposes the conventional wisdom favouring relaxation of
egulations on the labor market to increase the welfare of workers
hrough more employment generation. Although we have not stud-
ed the existence of any possible causal direction in this regard, our
ndings corroborate those by Deakin and Sarkar (2011). However,
ince we observe such result only in few cases of the alternatives
e have considered and even those at 10% level of signiﬁcance, it
ould, therefore, pose an alarming lesson to India’s political lead-
rship where loss of sizable amount of work-hours due to labor
nrest and related extremist activities from the labor union(s) is
lmost a routine phenomenon throughout the country, in general
nd that in her few States like West Bengal14, in particular that
14 One can recall the ultimate consequence of the destructive political agitation by
he  All India Trinamool Congress Party against the Tata Motor’s then proposed NANO panel.
pro-employee amendment in labor laws could make employees
happy in the short run, however, that may  seem to be an illusion and
this vulnerable section of the society (i.e., the working class) may
have to ultimately pay its price through their job-loss. Alternatively,
if sufﬁcient ﬂexibility to the entrepreneur is offered in their decision
to employ workers as per their own  rational requirement, backed by
the peaceful law-and-order situation maintained by the concerned
administrative authorities, might ultimately become sustainably
beneﬁcial to the working class. Government can rationally inter-
fere into it and that even only whenever it is required and to the
minimal possible extent, too! However, at this stage it could at best
be a hypothesis and nothing concrete could be said without further
rigorous analysis in this direction, at least for India!
As for the other explanatory variables are concerned, real wage
per worker has a signiﬁcant inverse effect on employment in all
the cases under the FE and Parks (1967) model, thereby corrob-
orating the Besley-Burgess assertion that industries may  shift to
more capital intensive production techniques when formal sector
wage increases to substitute dearer labor input by the relatively
cheaper capital input. Industries may  even go looking for leasing
out some of their ancillary activities through sub-contracting whichcases wherever it becomes signiﬁcant as an explanatory variable. To
project at Singur in West Bengal in this regard and may have a comparison between
the  overall socio-economic impact on the local livelihood thereafter at Singur (from
where the Tata Motor had to shift their factory) and at Sanand in Gujarat (where
ultimately they re-settled their NANO factory).
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Table  9
Correlation coefﬁcient between developmental revenue expenditure and developmental capital expenditure during the study period.
Correlation coefﬁcient
(in %)
Correlation coefﬁcient
(in %)
State Per capita
values
Total
values
State Per capita
values
Total
values
Andhra Pradesh –23.8 –27.0 Orissa –24.2 –12.4
Bihar  –28.9 –27.6 Punjab –8.0 4.2
Gujarat –25.5 –28.3 Rajasthan –4.7 12.3
Haryana –25.8 –24.4 Tamil Nadu –3.7 6.9
Karnataka –17.3 –15.8 Uttar Pradesh –0.5 10.5
Kerala –18.8 –15.7 West Bengal –33.5 –35.0
Madhya Pradesh –19.8 –12.2 All India –6.1 –4.6
Maharashtra –24.7 –15.9
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ource: Authors’ own compilation.
e speciﬁc, for our regression equations to explain actual level of
mployment, rather than rate of employment, we have observed
hat the work force variable has a signiﬁcant positive impact on
he explained variable. As is already mentioned, we  have tested
he possible effect of DCExp on employment for three alternative
ases, i.e., at the level of the variable, with its one year lag value
nd with its two years lag value and observed it to have a posi-
ive effect on the dependent variable for some of these three cases,
owever, for the two periods lag the model ﬁts the best! Although
e observe some exceptions in this regard in some other mod-
ls, in view of the fact that the Parks (1967) model is supposed
o provide the most robust result, we draw such conclusion on
he basis of the results so obtained. This indicates that (a) more
nd more public sector capital expenditure for development pur-
ose is one important favourable factor in job creation, possibly
hrough improvement in overall infrastructural condition to make
nvestment climate more attractive to the potential entrepreneurs;
nd (b) public sector capital expenditure for development purpose
nderstandably requires some time to be realized practically. On
he other hand, however, DRExp is observed to have an ambiguous
ffect on employment. To be speciﬁc, its estimated coefﬁcient has
een observed to be positive and signiﬁcant for some cases while
hat is negative and signiﬁcant for the others, thereby pointing to
he fact that although there may  be a positive impact of this variable
n improving employment scenario through overall improvement
n human capital development to make workers better employ-
ble, it may  sometimes be so counterproductive that even reduces
mployment opportunity, possibly because of the fact that such
evenue expenditure is ﬁnanced compromising corresponding cap-
tal expenditure, through possible negative effect on infrastructure.
his assertion is clearly supported by correlation structure between
hese two variables (as shown in the Table 9) which is negative for
ll the States considered for our study (at the per capita level) and
lso is negative for overwhelming majority of the States (at the
verall level) as well as for the country as a whole.
Installed capacity of electricity generation variable shows a signif-
cant positive effect throughout on employment generation. This
orroborates Besley-Burgess assertion that the availability of more
lectricity would induce modern entrepreneur to invest more since
lmost all sort of industrial activities nowadays heavily rely upon
ower supply. Of course, an alternative possibility may  also be
here that increase in availability of electricity may  induce the
ntrepreneurs to replace labor by more and more advanced auto-
ated machineries, in general and for the situation when real wage
ate is fast increasing, in particular, which couldn’t otherwise be
nstalled at all if power shortage is in place. This is also proposed
n the literature that the increasing mechanization of the Indian
anufacturing sector actually replaced labor during the 1980s and
990s (Anderson Business Consulting, 2003). Our ﬁnding in thisregard, however, does not support this view. Real per capita NSDP
has also signiﬁcant positive effect on employment generation for
most of the cases, with exceptions only for 25% of the cases (i.e., six
out of total twenty four alternatives).
5. Concluding remarks
There are two divergent stands on the relation between labor
regulation and employment, namely the distortionist and the insti-
tutionalist views. Proponents of the earlier view opine that labor
regulation would affect the smooth functioning and instantaneous
adjustment mechanism of the labor market, thereby lowering rates
of job creation and raise unemployment. It also likely to hinder
the entire economy to perform smoothly, resulting in lower levels
of growth and productivity and higher level of poverty. There-
fore, labor market rigidities through various regulatory measures
designed to protect the poor eventually end up hurting them!
However, although such proposition is widely accepted, it is not
unanimously appreciated in the literature. The latter view opines
that, and in fact, there is a growing empirical literature that sug-
gests otherwise. They advocate that the labor market regulations
and trade unions’ bargaining power play an important role in pro-
tecting not only the vulnerable sections of the society, but beneﬁt
the economy as a whole as well. For instance, labor regulations
might end up boosting productivity by making job-training manda-
tory, which has an obvious favorable bearing on overall growth and
prosperity of a country.
We have investigated into this debate to see which of these
two alternative views actually valid for the post-liberalized Indian
economy, following the study of Besley and Burgess (2004), the
pioneering work in this regard in India. However, while the Besley
and Burgess (2004) study was for 1954-1992, we conﬁne ourselves
for the three-decade period since 1981, which can be better char-
acterized as a period of gradual and steady withdrawal of the State
controls from various aspects of the economy. Our empirical ﬁnd-
ings corroborate, although not very strongly, the institutionalist
view, i.e., pro-worker labor regulation actually induces employ-
ment. Among the other factors, we  observe that there is signiﬁcant
negative effect of real wage rate on formal sector manufacturing
employment whereas each of the variables like workforce (as a
control variable while we consider employment as our depend-
ent variable), per capita real developmental capital expenditure, per
capita electricity generation capacity of the respective State and
real per capita net state domestic product has signiﬁcant positive
effect on employment. However, effect of per capita real develop-
mental revenue expenditure seems to have an ambiguous effect in
this regard, thereby indicating absence of any conclusive impact
of this variable towards job creation whether improving overall
human capital to make people better employable or whether such
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xpenditure is actually ﬁnanced through compromising associ-
ted capital expenditure for overall infrastructural improvement
hereby fails to attract more and more entrepreneur to invest! Cor-
elation structure between these two variables, however, clearly
upports the latter.
ppendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found, in
he online version, at doi:10.1016/j.jefas.2016.06.002.
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